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This paper presents an approach based on network theory to deal with risk interactions in 
large engineering projects. Indeed, such projects are exposed to numerous and interdependent 
risks of various nature, which makes their management more difficult. In this paper, a 
topological analysis based on network theory is presented, which aims at identifying key 
elements in the structure of interrelated risks potentially affecting a large engineering project. 
This analysis serves as a powerful complement to classical project risk analysis. Its originality 
lies in the application of some network theory indicators to the project risk management field. 
The construction of the risk network requires the involvement of the project manager and 
other team members assigned to the risk management process. Its interpretation improves 
their understanding of risks and their potential interactions. The outcomes of the analysis 
provide a support for decision-making regarding project risk management. An example of 
application to a real large engineering project is presented. The conclusion is that some new 
insights can be found about risks, about their interactions and about the global potential 
behavior of the project. 
 




Projects are usually complex and risky. They require the timely accomplishment of a 
number of activities, carried out by a number of human and material resources. Unexpected 
conditions or planning errors may lead to failures which can undermine the successful 
realization of the project on numerous parameters, like time, cost, scope, quality, safety, 
security, health, and environment. We refer to such events as project risks, when they are 
identified, analyzed and treated before they occur. Within the same project, the existence of 
interrelated risks involves that the occurrence of one risk may trigger one or more other risks 
with potential propagation phenomena like reaction chains, amplification chains or loops. In 
this sense, in this paper we talk of risk interdependency between two risks. A consequence of 
a risk is then triggering of another risk and not the direct impact of the risk itself (e.g. on time, 
scope or cost), which of course exists but is not the focus here. The consequence of this 
complexity is a lack of capacity to anticipate and control the behavior of the project. 
Large engineering projects are facing a growing complexity, in both their structure and 
context due to the involvement of numerous, diverse and strongly interrelated elements [1-3]. 
This has sparked research works on the concept of complexity, under two main scientific 
approaches [4]. The first one, usually known as the field of descriptive complexity, considers 
complexity as an intrinsic property of a system. For example, Baccarini in [1] considers 
project complexity through the concepts of technological complexity and organizational 
complexity. He regards them as the core components of project complexity which he tries to 
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describe exhaustively. The second approach, usually known as the field of perceived 
complexity, considers complexity as subjective, since the complexity of a system is 
improperly understood through the perception of an observer. According to Vidal and 
co-workers, ―project complexity is the property of a project which makes it difficult to 
understand, foresee and keep under control its overall behavior, even when given reasonably 
complete information about the project system. Its drivers are factors related to project size, 
project variety, project interdependence and project context‖ [5]. 
In this setting, Project Risk Management (PRM) is an indispensable activity for project 
management, even more for large engineering projects dealing with large stakes and involving 
interdependent activities and organizations [6-9]. In PRM, risk analysis is used for evaluating 
and prioritizing risks, essentially with respect to their probability and impact. The outputs of 
the analysis support decision-making, e.g., in terms of planning response actions and 
allocating resources.  
In practice, the PRM methodologies are often used to analyze risks independently, 
according to their individual characteristics, with more or less detailed and quantitative 
approaches, based on experience and/or expertise [10-16]. Various methods can be used to 
identify causes and effects of a single risk. For instance, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) consists in a qualitative analysis of dysfunction modes followed by a quantitative 
analysis of their effects, in terms of probability and impact (or severity) [17, 18]; fault tree 
and cause tree analyses determine the conditions which lead to an event and link them 
through logical connectors in a tree-structure which clearly displays causes and effects of the 
particular risk analyzed [19]. Other techniques, like Bayesian networks, system dynamics or 
Monte-Carlo simulation exist [20-22]. But these methods are focused on risk prioritization 
considering probability and/or impact of the risks, called Probability-Impact Grid (PIG). 
Some researchers highlight the weakness related to the fact that important interdependencies 
are not considered in PRM processes using the PIG approach [23-25]. The importance of 
modeling interdependencies, and techniques to do this, are presented in several works, whether 
directly on risk [26, 27] or indirectly on other objects inside the project [28, 29]. 
In the work here presented, the complexity of interactions among project risks is 
modeled and represented in terms of a risk network [30]. A topological analysis is then 
performed on this network, with the aim of giving complementary information, prioritizing 
some risks and risk interactions in relation to their position in the network. This is relevant 
because in some cases, it may happen that risks of minor concern are the source of a sequence 
of propagating effects whose outcome is of far higher severity.   
A method based on Design Structure Matrix (DSM) [31] is introduced to build the 
network of risk interactions. A topological analysis typical of network theory is then 
performed to identify the characteristics of the resulting risk network. In the last decade, a 
number of studies have focused on the modeling of complex systems such as critical 
infrastructures from the standpoint of network theory, to understand how the topological 
network underlying the system influences its behavior, and eventually its characteristics of 
stability and robustness to faults and attacks [32]. Topological network analysis has been 
exploited to serve as a screening tool to identify key components in different types of 
infrastructure networks, like power transmission systems [33] and railway networks [34] for 
example. The originality of the work presented in this paper is the tailoring and application of 
network theory-based topological analysis in the context of project risk management. The 
application to a real large engineering project enables the usefulness and practicality of the 
approach to be validated.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the modeling of project risk network is 
introduced, with the identification and assessment of risks and risk interactions. Section 3 
introduces some topological indicators and explains how the network theory-based 
topological analysis is performed on the project risk network. An example of application to a 
tramway implementation project is presented in Section 4. The added value and applications 
to decision support are discussed in Section 5. Some conclusions are drawn in Section 6, with 
perspectives on future work. 
 
2. Building the structure of project risk network 
To perform the topological analysis for exploring the risk interactions-based properties, 
the project risk network should be constructed. In the following parts of this section, we 
introduce the process of building the project risk network structure. 
Step 1. Risk identification using classical methods  
Risk identification is usually the first step for project risk analysis, aimed at determining 
events which could affect project objectives positively or negatively [35]. This paper mainly 
focuses on the conventional risk events with negative effects. There are a number of classical 
methods for identifying individual project risks. They are based on analogy [36-38], on 
heuristics [39, 40] or are analytic [41]. Our study uses directly the risks previously identified 
by the project manager using these classical methods. The result of these analyses, the project 
risk list, serves as an input for studying risk interactions. Even if some authors propose an 
approach to risk dynamics analysis [42], the process is performed with a stable list of risk 
with stable characteristics. 
Step 2. Identification of risk interactions using DSM method 
Identification of risk interactions is the step of determining the cause-effect relationship 
between risks. This is also the main step for building the project risk network structure. Risk 
interaction is considered as the existence of a possible precedence relationship between two 
risks Ri and Rj.  
The Design Structure Matrix (DSM) method introduced by Steward [31] has proven to 
be a practical tool for representing and analyzing relations and dependencies among 
components in system design [43, 44]. In our work, we propose to extend the concept of DSM 
to risks in project management. The interrelations between project objects, such as activities, 
actors and product components, can facilitate the identification of interrelations between the 
risks related to these objects. For instance, the project schedule gives information about 
activity-activity sequence relationships. This enables the relationship between two risks of 
delay for these activities to be identified. A component-component relationship (whether 
functional, structural or physical) means that risks, which may be related to product functions, 
quality, delay or cost, can be linked, since a problem on one component may have an 
influence on another (budget limits, for instance). In a similar way, the Domain Mapping 
Matrix (DMM) introduced by Danilovic and Browning [44] and Multiple-Domain Matrix 
(MDM) introduced by Lindemann, Maurer and Braun [45] are helpful in identifying risk 
interactions across different domains of the project. 
We define the Risk Structure Matrix (RSM), which is a binary and square matrix with 
entry RSMij = 1 when there is a relationship link from Ri to Rj. Figure 1 gives an example of 
the RSM representation of a network of risks. 
When performing the risk interaction identification, new risks may appear, for two 
reasons. Some are a consequence or cause of other risks already present in the initial list; 
others are seen as intermediary risks which are useful to explain the link between two or more 
existing risks. Identification is done on direct cause-effect relationship. However, we ask 
interviewees whether they think this is a direct link or if new intermediary elements deserve 
to be included. When there is a dependency between risks R1 and R3 because R1 is linked to 
R2 and R2 is linked to R3, this is called an indirect dependency and there is no need to 
formalize a dependency between R1 and R3. On the contrary, when there is a link between R1 
and R3, but experts realize that there is an intermediary risk, R2, that deserves to be included 
in the model, then the direct dependency between R1 and R3 is replaced by two direct 
dependencies, between respectively R1 and R2, and R2 and R3.     
   
 
(a) example of RSM                  (b) example of project risk network 
Figure 1. Illustration of RSM and project risk network (adapted from [30]) 
         
We assume that the identified risk interrelationship does not address concerns about the 
impact of this interaction. In practice, a sanity check is performed: suppose we know that Rj 
declared Ri as a cause; if Ri did not declare Rj as a consequence, then there is a mismatch. 
Each mismatch is studied and solved, like in analogous works by Sosa, Eppinger and Rowels 
about interactions between project actors [46].   
Step 3. Assessment of risk interactions 
A qualitative assessment is also conducted to screen out some insignificant risk 
interactions. Based on the established RSM, the weight of each non-zero element in the 
matrix (identified potential risk interaction) can be assessed during the interviews or meeting 
with the project manager and/or related experts involved. Direct assessment is made for each 
potential interaction by one or more experts according to their experience and/or expertise. In 
this study, a qualitative scale (from 0 to 10) is used for assessing the strength of risk 
interactions, in terms of cause-effect relationship. For example, the identified risk interactions 
with the scale below 2 (equal to 0 or 1) are considered insignificant and thus are not included 
in the risk network structure for the subsequent topological analysis. In the process of 
assessment, different experts may get outcomes with differences. To moderate this kind of 
confusion and divergence, particular experts are asked to be responsible for several rows and 
columns in the RSM according to their specialty. Finally, the assessment results from different 
experts need to be combined and consolidated.  
One should be aware of the particularity of a project risk network, as compared to, for 
example, other physical networks of critical infrastructures, like a power transmission 
network. A project risk network links elements (nodes of risks), which can possibly be 
affected by the potential propagation (arcs of risk interactions) of effects of different nature. 
Vidal and Marle developed a model of defining several types of interactions between risks 
[47]. The specificity of this network is to involve potential interactions between nodes which 
are not necessarily related to physical and material characteristics, like delay risk for instance.  
 
3. Topological analysis of the project risk network 
For the topological analysis of a project risk network, we represent the risk network by a 
graph G(N, K), in which the identified risks are mapped into N nodes connected by K 
unweighted arcs. As shown in Figure 1, the risk network is a directed network: each arc from 
Ri to Rj represents the fact that there is a directed potential cause-effect link between them. In 
the jargon of graph theory, the RSM is the adjacency matrix of the risk network [48]. 
Such representation enables us to study the structural properties of the risk network, by 
means of some topological indicators tailored to the problem at hand. These indicators can 
help identifying key factors (risks or risk interactions) and improve the project manager’s 
understanding of the vulnerabilities in the network. 
The numbers of nodes and risk natures/domains describe the size and diversity of the risk 
network. The density of the graph can be measured by Eq. (1). Usually some pairs of nodes 
are disconnected and thus the risk network is not a fully connected graph. There may also be 
unconnected nodes representing isolated risks, i.e., risks having no identified cause-effect 
interrelation or negligible cause-effect interrelation with other risks in the system.  
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 The degree of nodes provides an indication of the local connectivity characteristic of a 
risk. The number of outgoing arcs is the activity degree of a risk (Eq. (2)) and the incoming 
arcs give the passivity degree of it (Eq. (3))[49]. These two metrics of degree convey the 
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In order to get further insights on the global connectivity property of the risks, we study 
the reachability degree of nodes. We introduce the concept of Risk Reachability Matrix 
(RRM), with RRMij = 1 if there exists at least one path from Ri to Rj. Both the shortest path 
between each pair of risks and the RRM can be obtained using the Floyd’s sequential shortest 
path iterative algorithm [50]. The reachability density defined in Eq. (4) is a measure of the 
complexity of the risk network based on risk reachability: 
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The number of reachable nodes (Eq. (5)) indicates the number of other risks that a given 
risk can impact directly and indirectly. The number of possible sources (Eq. (6)) accounts for 
the fact that the occurrence of a designated risk can possibly originate from many other risks 
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The introduced indicators of reachability degree help us understand the global consequences 
and sources of a risk, and enable us to classify them into different categories. 
In project management, risks are also usually categorized into different domains such as 
technical, financial and managerial. Further, from the point of view of organization, different 
risk owners are assigned in charge of one or several risks. The number of interfaces between 









I defined in Eqs. (7) and (8) below denote the number of local direct 
interfaces from Du to Dv and from Ou to Ov respectively, where Du and Ov stand for domain u 
and risk owner v: 
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I  defined in Eqs. (9) and (10) indicate the 
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The interface indicators help project managers identify the interconnections between 
different domains and enhance the intercommunication between correlated counterparts. It 
notably enables the grouping of risk owners in order to improve coordinated decision-making. 
For the purpose of anticipating the potential risk propagation and related needs for 
protection, another indicator is here introduced. In general network theory, the betweenness 
centrality [51, 52] is based on the idea that a node or an arc in a network is central if it lies 
between many other nodes. In a risk network, if a risk node or a risk interaction arc lies in at 
least one of the paths connecting a pair of other nodes, we count that node or arc as lying 
between them. The betweenness centrality of Rk and the betweenness centrality of the arc 
from Rp to Rq can then be calculated by the following equations: 
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In practice, project risk networks are often quite sparse, with K<<N (N-1)/2, hence we do 
not normalize the betweenness centralities by dividing by their possible upper values, i.e., (N 
− 1)(N − 2) for nodes and (N − 2)(N − 3) for arcs. In this way, the betweenness centralities of 
nodes or arcs denote the number of pairs of risks they lie between. Knowledge of these 
centralities assists in identifying hubs in the network which play the role of key passages for 
risk propagation: the project manager should consider how to avoid propagation through these 
passages by controlling the risks and/or blocking their interactions. 
 
4. Application to a tramway infrastructure project 
In this Section, we illustrate the application of the proposed approach to a real large 
engineering project, aimed at building the infrastructure and associated systems of the future 
tramway in a city with a population of 750 000. Both classical project risk analysis and the 
proposed network theory-based analysis on the topological structure are carried out.   
The project includes the construction and implementation of tramway, equipments, and 
civil work, with 10 years duration and hundreds of millions € budget. The leading company is 
a designer and manufacturer of trains, which recently extended its scope by proposing ―turn 
key‖ projects, including not only the trains, but also the complete infrastructure around the 
trains. The project thus comprises: 
 The construction of a depot to stock trains and to execute their control and 
maintenance; 
 The installation of tracks throughout the city, over land with many steep slopes; 
 The delivery of the corresponding trains, including redesign activities if the current 
version does not fit with the city’s specific requirements; 
 The establishment of a traffic signaling operating system, which gives priority to the 
tramway so as to guarantee travel time performance levels. 
4.1. Building the project risk network 
A project risk list is provided by the project manager and its expert team, containing 56 
identified risks at the main level, with their name, domain and risk owner information, as 
shown in Table 1. These potential negative risks are classified according to six domains (22 
risks of D1-Technical, 24 risks of D2-Contractual, 6 risks of D3-Financial, 1 risk of 
D4-Client/Partner/Subcontractor, 2 risks of D5-Project management on construction site, 1 
risk of D6-Country). Risk ownership in terms of responsibility is assigned to 11 actors in the 
project management team. Basic characteristics of risks have been assessed by the project 
manager and associated experts, as shown in Table 1, including qualitative probability and 
impact scales, as well as criticality (product of probability and impact).  
Identification of the risk interdependencies (by the steps described in Section 2) allows 
defining the structure of the project risk network, shown in Figure 7. The network is 
comprised of 56 nodes (risks) and 95 arcs (risk interactions), with only 5 unconnected nodes 
(R8, R11, R15, R23 and R34). For each node, experts were asked to provide information 
about the potential causes and effects (to explore the row and the column corresponding to the 
considered risk). In the end, the aggregation of local cause-effect relationship identifications 
enables to display the global risk network. This enables a final meeting to be organized in 
which interviewees can propose new nodes and connections in the risk graph. The graph 
density is equal to 0.0308, showing that the network is relatively sparse. 
The assessment of the existing risk interactions was then performed on a 10-level Likert 
scale, due to the high expertise of interviewees. Six of the risks which were present in the 
initial list (R1, R8, R11, R15, R23 and R34) were considered as poorly interrelated with 
others and possibly negligible for this study. Some difficulties were encountered while 
performing the assessment. In particular, this step requires the participation of several experts 
involved in the project since it necessitates a very wide overview of the project elements and 
stakes. 
 
Table 1. Project risk list with classical risk characteristics assessment 
 
 
4.2. Classical project risk analysis results 
In Figure 2 the classical project risk analysis results are displayed in a risk probability vs. impact diagram, 
where each risk identified in Table 1 is represented by a dot. The limits between different criticality classes 
should be defined a priori, before the risk assessment. For example, risks can be categorized into several 
levels of criticality, such as critical, high, moderate and low risks. In Figure 2, we only highlight the top ten 
risks according to their criticality value. The project is based on a contract including many contractual terms 
involving financial penalties in case of failure, whether on time or quality aspects. Almost every problem is 
then potentially transformed directly or indirectly into an additional cost and then a profit loss. It is thus not 
surprising to see that R2 (Liquidated damages), R37 (Rejection of Extension Of Time), R43 (Return profit 
decrease) and R55 (Available cash flow decrease) are among the most critical risks. Other risks with high 
criticality are generally related to the final delivery, like R12 (Operating certificate), or some big parts of the 
project, like R18 (Civil Work delay) and R40 (Operating Center installation). 
 
 
Figure 2. Display of classical project risk analysis results 
 
4.2. Topological analysis results  
In Figure 3, we display the activity degree and passivity degree of risks, introduced respectively in Eq (2) 
and Eq (3), in a matrix diagram. As we can see, a risk can directly impact at most 5 other risks; the passivity 
degree varies from 0 to 19, while only several risks have a large number of direct predecessors. For example, 
R2 (Payment threshold) has 19 immediate predecessor risks. Most risks have 1 or 2 immediate inputs and 
outputs, implying that the local connectivity of this network is not significant.  
 
   
Figure 3. Diagram of degree of risks 
 
Similarly, the reachability degree of risks, namely the number of reachable nodes, and the number of 
possible sources are displayed in Figure 4 to give a global view of the connectivity property of risks. The 
reachability density of the network, introduced in Eq (4), is equal to 0.0854. This shows that the risk network 
is more complex in the global view of reachability, compared with the low graph density of 0.0308 of the local 
scale. The roles of these risks in the network are marked with different shapes in Figure 7. Some risks with 
few predecessors, but that lead to many others are likely to be source risks, such as R6 (New local laws and 
regulations), R49 (Error in the topography survey), R27 (Track installation machine performance), R16 
(Archeological findings), and R19 (Responsibility of client on civil work delay). Some risks with few 
successors, but which come from many possible sources, are regarded as accumulation risks, often related to 
project results like financial performance, e.g., R43 (Return profit decrease) and R55 (Available cash flow 
decrease). Risks in the middle of Figure 4 act as transition risks. Some of these have more sources and fewer 
reachable risks, and thus are closer to the accumulation risks, such as R2 (Payment threshold), R12 (Operating 
certificate delay) and R52 (Reengineering / Redesign); some others are closely related to the source risks, for 
example, R5 (Traction/braking function: behavior in degraded mode on slope) and R18 (Civil work delay & 
continuity); other risks like R10 (Travel time performance), R13 (Reliability & availability targets) and R39 
(Risk on certification of equipment) have approximately equal number of possible sources and reachable 
nodes. This classification of risks depending of their respective number of inputs and outputs is useful for 
assisting the project manager in deciding how to treat them, independently of their individual assessment.  
 
 
Figure 4. Diagram of reachability degree of risks 
 
 Figures 5 and 6 show the number of interfaces between risk domains and owners respectively, from both 
local and global points of view. Since most risks are belonging to D1-Technical, D2-Contractual and 
D3-Financial, a large amount of interactions are related to them. In Figure 5, we can see that a large 
proportion of direct connections are inside a domain (Figure 5(a)). However, many interfaces between 
different domains have emerged in the global vision (Figure 5(b)). For instance, D1-Technical risks will 
indirectly cause more contractual and financial risks in D2 and D3; risks from 
D4-Client/Partner/Subcontractor, D5-Project management on construction site and D6-Country have no direct 
influence on financial risks but will reach them after propagation of several steps.  
 
 
   (a) local vision                        (b) global vision 
Figure 5. Interfaces between risk domains 
 
Similarly, many indirect interfaces between risk owners have appeared in Figure 6(b). We find that the 
risk owner O2 receives impacts from each of the other owners, and he/she should be more aware of the 
noticeably increased potential influences from several ones like O1 and O4. Some risk owners cannot identify 
the direct impact from other actors, but they should foresee and be prepared for the propagated consequences. 
For instance, the interfaces in the cell O2 to O3 have increased from 0 to 6. 
 
  (a) local vision                            (b) global vision 
Figure 6. Interfaces between risk owners 
 
Table 2 displays the top five nodes and top five arcs with the highest betweenness centrality, and these are 
also highlighted in Figure 7 (respectively with grey-filled nodes and bold arcs). Risks with the highest 
betweenness centrality such as R2 (Payment threshold) and R52 (Reengineering / Redesign) act as hubs 
connecting many pairs of risks. We can see that the most important arcs are related to these top risks. R10 and 
R13 are the sources of many events and should be treated with caution, mainly with preventive actions or with 
confinement actions (arcs from R10 or from R13, especially the R10->R13 arc). Confinement actions are 
quite new in the project management field, where the actions are focused on risk nodes only.  
 
Table 2. The top risks and interactions according to the betweenness centrality 
Rank Risk ID 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Arc ID Betweenness centrality 
1 R2 82 R10->R13 42 
2 R52 60 R2->R55 41 
3 R10 56 R13->R39 40 
4 R12 48 R52->2 40 
















5. Discussion of the results 
 The results obtained in the previous application show the usefulness of the topological network-based 
analysis for large engineering project risk management. The proposed indicators provide the project manager 
with useful information for understanding risks and their relationships at both local and global scales.  
 Several critical risks identified by classical project risk analysis are confirmed by the topological analysis 
to play an important role in the risk network, for instance, the financial risks like R43 and R55. In addition, 
more is learned about the relationship among risks in the network. Some new key risks are highlighted by the 
topological analysis, which are supplement results to classical analysis. The risks identified can be classified 
into different categories according to their positions in the network. This information enables planning by the 
project manager of complementary mitigation actions suitable for the particular type of risks. These actions 
are included in the global risk response plan, as part of the project plan, to adequately manage the required 
resources, budget and time. Without this topological analysis, the project manager would not have decided to 
plan actions on these specific risks. For example, many source risks like R16, R19, R6, R27, and R49 were 
not identified as critical in the classical analysis. Paying attention to these risks at the beginning of the project 
may help avoid many problems arising at later stages. Preventive or confinement actions are more likely to be 
effective for this kind of risks. Corrective or protection actions are often designed for accumulation risks like 
R43 and R55 to reduce losses. Avoidance or mix of strategies can be applied to transition risks for mitigating 
the risk propagation. Without this approach, the project manager would not have decided to launch actions on 
these specific risks, highlighted for topological reasons.  
Moreover, important interactions of risks with a high betweenness centrality value are also identified. 
Resolving these will mitigate the potential propagation between many risks in the network. For example, 
cutting the arc R10->R13 would separate two parts of the network, so that if the internal risks of one part are 
correctly managed, no risk of external origin needs to be considered. This is important since internal risks are 
generally easier to influence and to manage for the owners. Allocating resources and conducting actions on 
these key risks or interactions can be efficient for mitigating the propagation phenomena and reducing the 
overall risk exposure. 
As an example, we tested a combination of four actions: 1) avoid R12 (Operating certificate delay); 2) 
avoid R27 (Track installation machine performance); 3) avoid R52 (Reengineering / redesign); and 4) cut the 
link between R10 (Travel time performance) and R13 (Reliability and availability targets). Applying these 
actions translates into removing the nodes (R12, R27, and R52) and the arc (R10->R13) in the risk network. 
Note that only R12 is in the top-ten list of critical risks according to classical project risk analysis. R12 is a 
transition risk with many causes and only two, but important direct consequences which are financial risks of 
R2 and R55. R27 is low in terms of classical criticality, but is a source of numerous and important risks, so it 
may be worthy to use a non-innovative but non-risky track installation machine, in order to estimate with 
more reliability the duration of track installation activity. R52 is a product-related risk, depending on multiple 
causes related to the train performance, the customer requirements and the interface rail-wheel. In order to 
prevent this risk, a more robust requirement definition should be made at the beginning of the project, 
including the specificities of the project (the city topography and the special needs of the customer). Of course 
this has to be done for every project, but in this case we contend that a particular effort should be put on the 
reliability of the initial product requirements, because of their multiple consequences. Finally, we propose to 
act on the link between R10 and R13, which is quite specific to a topological analysis, since we do not act on 
nodes, but on one arc. We do not avoid the problem caused by R10 and its other consequences, which are 
mainly related to customer and contract, but we avoid propagation to another part of the network, where 
technical and product-related risks could have been activated. It is feasible to cut the transition between the 
two risks, since there are complementary means to reach reliability and availability targets (train size, train 
number) without redesigning the train and delaying the delivery of operating certificate. Further work will 
integrate the cost of actions and make the balance with the benefits of risk reduction. To conclude, all the 
proposed actions are feasible : three of them come from the topological analysis whereas only one could be 
identified through classical analysis.  
By undertaking the proposed actions, the graph density (Eq (1)) has been reduced from 0.0308 to 0.0265 
(by 14.0%), and the reachability density (Eq (4)) of the network has been reduced from 0.0854 to 0.0679 (by 
20.5%). The new top five risks and interactions with the highest betweenness centrality are given in Table 3. 
Compared with Table 2, we can see that the ranking has changed and the values of betweenness centrality 
have significantly decreased. The change of the risk network structure is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Table 3. The top betweenness centralities after taking actions 
Rank Risk ID 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Arc ID Betweenness centrality 
1 R2 64 R2->R55 32 
2 R55 39 R10->R44 21 
3 R10 28 R18->R48 8 
4 R44 24 R46->R10 8 
5 R18 16 R5->R46 7 
 
Also, the interface degree between domains/owners (Eqs (7) and (8)) gives the project manager 
knowledge of how to improve the structure of organization. Reassignment can be conducted so as to reduce 
the interfaces between different owners. In other words, closely related risks should be assigned when possible 
to the same owner, in order to mitigate the risk of information asymmetry or non-communication, and to 
reduce the cost of communication. These reassignments are identified through different sources. First, the 
right part of Figure 6 gives global information on the direct and indirect interfaces between owners. For 
instance, owners O2 and O4 are strongly related with indirect links, which means that their relation in terms of 
communication and coordination should be well formalized. Second, the potential chains or pieces of the 
network with several interrelated risks and some of the highlighted nodes and arcs (Figure 8) that deserve 
particular attention for topological reasons (Table 3) assist in identifying more effective local reassignments. 
For a given couple, triplet or group of risks, decisions have to be made on the basis of the existing 
assignments (Table 1). It depends on the number of actors currently involved and on their skills, in terms of 
capacity to become the owner of the designated risk. For example, in order to get fewer people involved in 
potential propagation chains (Figure 8), we can reassign the ownership of:  
 risk R18 to actor O2 (instead of O8), since O2 is already the owner of R16 and R19.  
 risk R32 to actor O3 (instead of O5), since O3 is already the owner of R51 and R48. It permits also to 
have only one human interface between O2 and O3 for managing the interactions between several 
risks. 
 risk R5 and R46 to actor O4 (instead of O1), thus actor O4 is in charge of managing several risks 



























Figure 8. Structure of the project risk network after taking actions
6. Conclusions and perspectives  
 This paper presents an original network theory-based analysis of interconnected risks in large engineering 
projects. Network theory indicators are specifically tailored to project risk analysis, in an effort to complement 
the classical approach with respect to modeling the complexity of interdependent risks. A realistic application 
on a tramway implementation project is performed with the involvement of the project manager and the team 
of experts. The results obtained show that the topological analysis by network theory adds value to the 
classical project risk analysis, in identifying both the important risks and the important risk interactions with 
respect to their role in the network behavior. This gives additional information for the next step of 
decision-making, since risks may be considered important for criticality of their impact and/or topological 
reasons. With respect to the latter, a risk taken individually may be non-critical, but through interactions could 
become the source of other risks, including some critical ones. Based on the analysis outcomes, a combination 
of feasible risk mitigation actions are performed on the risk network and the results illustrate the effectiveness 
of using network theory for project risk analysis. The method is expected to be applicable to a wide set of 
engineering projects for decision support, including allocating resources for risk mitigation and reassigning 
risk owners. 
 In this contribution, only conventional negative project risks have been studied. In a future work, also 
positive risks and interactions with positive effects could be taken represented and modeled in the project risk 
network. Moreover, interdependencies coming from the upper organization levels (i.e. functions, programs or 
projects portfolio, and enterprise) or from external common cause of failures (e.g. the global financial crisis 
that impacts on both the main contractor and its s hubcontractors) could be included, as they can be relevant 
and critical sources of risk interdependencies.  
In practice, the risks may be formulated with an unclear distinction of the event, its cause and/or its effect. 
Some risk labels may contain different events, like ―risk of having this problem because of this source‖: this 
should be divided into two interrelated risks, respectively the event and the source. Moreover, some risks may 
also be related to the same object, but described by different parameters. For instance, if we have for the same 
activity three risks related to time, scope and cost parameters, this description is justified if and only if we find 
individual interactions with other risks (related to other activities, product components, product functions, 
project objectives, or human resources) which require to have this level of detail. Otherwise, a single risk 
related to ―problems in the activity‖ is enough. Work is ongoing to determine the proper level of details and 
the way to formulate risks in less ambiguous ways. 
Furthermore, we have assumed that the project risk network is static, namely all the risks and their 
interdependencies do not change along the progress of the project. However, more research is needed to 
analyze the dynamics of the network of interacting risks. The risk network should be monitored and periodic 
reviews conducted, which may lead to the identification of new risks, disappearance of some risks, update of 
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